Deň D: 6.6.1944. Operácia Overlord. Vylodenie spojeneckých vojsk vo francúzskej Normandii. Môj referát na hodinu dejepisu. Popisuje prípravy a prvý deň tejto najväčšej vojenskej operácie minulého storočia. 03/1997

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Vylodenie v Normandii

Overlord	Directive	Churchil

W. Churchil: Invasion in Normandy


The invasion to liberate northwest Europe began on June 6, 1944. The Normandy beaches were chosen by planners because they lay within range Or air cover and were less heavily defended than the obvious objec. ve of the Pas de Calais, the shortest distance between Great Britain and the Continent. Airborne drops at both ends of the beachheads were to protect the flanks, as well as open up roadways to the interior. Six divisions were to land on the first day; three U.S., two British and one Canadian. Two more British and one U.S. division were to follow up after the assault division had cleared the way through the beach defenses.
Logistical and organizational difficulties were enormous; problems getting troops loaded onto ships and then getting them from the ships onto the beaches, the transition from zero combat power to full combat power, subsequent restructuring of units to get them out of the beachhead to operate as standard land combat forces, as well as the vital task of regulating traffic flow from the beach exits inland-all these were major obstacles to be overcome by the allied staffs. Lack of a suitable port was provided for in the form of "mulberries," large artificial harbors constructed in England and floated to Normandy. Until the nearest major port (Cherbourg) was captured, all follow-on supplies and divisions would have to enter through the mulberries.
Disorganization, confusion, incomplete or faulty implementation of plans characterized the initial phases of the landings. This was especially true of the airborne landings which were badly scattered, as well as the first wave units landing on the assault beaches. Most of the troops were able to adapt to the disorganization, but at some point they would have to stop and reorganize to continue effective operations.
The physical geography of the beaches was important and a large part determined the type of troops that would be assigned to each obiective. An example would be the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc. The 2d and 5th (U.S.) Ranger Battalions trained for months to take this objective and were able to achieve their goals in spite of the almost total collapse of Their operations plan.

UTAH BEACH
UTAH BEACH was added to the initial invasion plan almost as an afterthought. The allies needed a major port as soon as possible, and UtTAH BEACH would put VII (U.S.) Corps within 60 kilometers of Cherbourg at the outset. The major obstacles in this sector were not so much the beach defenses, but the flooded and rough terrain that blocked the way north.

OMAHA BEACH
OMAHA BEACH linked the U.S. and British beaches. It was a critical link between the Contentin peninsula and the flat plain in front of Caen. Omaha was also the most restricted and heavily defended beach and for this reason at least one veteran U.S. Division (lst) was tasked to land there. The terrain was difficult. Omaha beach was unlike any of the other assault beaches in Normandy. Its crescent curve and unusual assortment of bluffs, cliffs and draws were immediately recognizable from the sea. It was the most defensible beach chosen for D-Day; in fact, many planners did not believe it a likely place for a major landing. The high ground commanded all approaches to the beach from the sea and tidal flats. Moreover, any advance made by U.S. troops from the beach would be limited to narrow passages between the bluffs. Advances directly up the steep bluffs were difficult in the extreme. German strongpoints were arranged to command all the approaches and pillboxes were sited in the draws to fire east and west, thereby enfilading troops while remaining concealed from bombarding warships. These pillboxes had to be taken out by direct assault. Compounding this problem was the allied intelligence failure to identify a nearly full-strength infantry division, the 352d, directly behind the beach. It was believed to be no further forward than St. Lo and Caumont, 20 miles inland.
V (U.S.) Corps was assigned to this sector. The objective was to obtain a lodgement area between Port-en-Bessin and the Vire River and ultimately push forward to St. Lo and Caumont in order to cut German communications (St. Lo was a major road junction). Allocated to the task were 1st and 29th (U.S.) Divisions, supported by the 5th Ranger Battalion and 5th Engineer Special Brigade.

GOLD BEACH
GOLD BEACH was the objective of the 50th (Northumbrian) Di-ision of the British 2d Army. Its primary task was to seize Arrolnanches (future site of a Mulberry) and drive inland to seize the road junction at Bayeux, as well as contact U.S. forces on their right and Canadians on their 1eft. The initial opposition was fierce, but the British invasion forces broke through with relatively light casualties and were able to reach their objectives in this sector. A major factor in their success was the British assault forces were lavishlly equipped with armor and "Funnies" of the 79th Armored Division. The "Funnies" were the specialist vehicles, armed with 29Omm mortars, designed for tasks such as clearing obstacles or minefields and destruction of large fixed fortifications. Perhaps the most famous is .he "Flail" tank, which was a Sherman equipped with a large roller to which was attached lengths of chain. These tanks were designed to clear terrain to their front, and detonate mine fields and other booby traps without danger to the tanks or infantry following. The U.S. reluctance to use any of these vehicles at their landing sites (they relied solely on combat engineers) was in large part responsible for the massive disaster that ensued on OMAHA BEACH.

JUNO BEACH
JUNO BEACH was the landing area for 3d Canadian Division. The Canadians were very concerned about their role in the invasion (as were most of the planning staff) as the memory of 2d Canadian Division's destruction at Dieppe was still fresh. But many lessons had been learned, and the 3d Canadian Division, in spite of heavy opposition at Courselles-sur-Mer, broke through and advanced nearly to their objective, the airfield at Carpiquet, west of Caen. The Canadians made the deepest penetration of any land forces on June 6th, again with moderate casualties.

SWORD BEACH
SWORD BEACH was the objective of 3d (British) Infantry Division. They were to advance inland as far as Caen, and line up with British Airborne forces east of the Orne River/Caen Canal. The Orne River bridges had been seized in late at night on the 5th of June by a glider-borne reinforced company commanded by Major John Howard. As at the other beaches, British forces penetrated quite a ways inland after breaking the opposition at water's edge. Unfortunately, the objective of Caen was probably asking too much of a single infantry division, especially given the traffic jams and resistance encountered further iniand. 1st Special Service (Commando) brigade commanded by Lord Lovat, linked up in the morrling with Howard's force at Pegasus bridge on the British left. Fierce opposition from the 2lst Panzer and later the 12th SS Panzer division prevented the British from reaching Caen on the 6th. Indeed, Caen was not taken until late June.

OPPOSITION
UTAH BEACH: The defense here consisted of a single outnumbered strong point called W5 which had been pulverized by the pre-landing bombardment. Leutnant Arthur Jahnke, commander of Strongpoint W5, surrendered when their only effective gun (dug-in 88mm) malfunctioned as a result of shrapne' damage.
OMAHA BEACH: One of the biggest problems was not only the restricted terrain and the dug in pillboxes, but the fact that allied intel1igence had overlooked the 352d Infantry Division, right behind the beaches. This unit, like the others in Normandy, was spread out but was an experienced unit that had served in Russia. It more than doubled the effectiveness of the coastal defenses, thus resulting in excessive U.S. losses. This unit was attached to the 84th German Corps, which had responsibility for the entire Normandy region. In addition, elements of the 3d Sturm-Flak Korps were spread out from Carentan to Bayeux. They contributed a large number of 20, 37 and 88mm guns to the derense, but the unit was badly disrupted by the pre-invasion air attack.
GOLD BEACH: Most of the opposition here consisted of "Ost" troops, Russian and Polish conscripts/prisoners fighting in the German Army, and men from the 716th Infantry Division, a second rate static unit with a large frontage (Caen Bayeux).
JUNO BEACH: The Canadians faced the same troops as were positioned behind GOLD, plus the 440th 0st Battalion dug-in at Courselles-sur-Mer. Later in the day they faced elements of 2lst Panzer and l2th SS Panzer Division, both deployed too far in the rear to hinder the actual landings.
SWORD BEACH: The 3d (British) Infantry Division faced, as the other beaches, well dug-in but overextended elements of 716th Infantry Division. The British also faced counter-attacks from l2th SS and 21st Panzer later in the day and into the night.

ALLIED AIRDROPS
The drops took place on both flanks of the invasion area in the late hours of June 5th and early on the morning of the 6th. British 6th Airborne dropped on the eastern flank to secure the bridges over the Orne and Dives rivers. The drops took place in clear weather, but were scattered over a large expanse of countryside. In spite of this, the British met most of their D-Day objectives, including the daring glider assault on the Orne River/Caen Canal bridges. The drop also confused the German defenders, thus buying time for the invasion troops.
The U.S. drops were completely scattered, with the exception of one regiment. This was a result of thick cloud cover and in some cases the inexperience of the pilots. As a result, the drop serials of 101st and 82d were scattered over a wide area of the Cotentin Peninsuld, some troops ending up 40 kms from their planned drop zones. The Germans had also flooded large areas of the Cotentin, including several drop zones. Scores of paratroopers drowned upon landing. Despite heavy localized resistance, some of which was encountered on the way to the ground, all U.S. units were able to gain their objectives to some extent with the forces available. Additionally, the scattered nature of the drop served to confuse and paralyze defending German units. The German commander of the 91st Luftlande Division, one of the best formations in the Cotentin, was ambushed and killed by troops of the 1Olst. As with the British drop, these events served to buy time for the sea-borne invaders.



"...This is much the greatest thing we have ever attempted.", Winston Churchill to President Roosevelt

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